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Perspectives on Intellectual Property 
A Personal Injury Law Perspective on 
Copyright in an Internet Age 
by 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
A recurring theme in modern copyright law is the notion that 
Internet technology unacceptably threatens the security of copyrights. 
The difficulty of policing millions of Internet users who can share files 
at the click of a button1 means that copyright holders have no easy 
way to control or ensure payment for unauthorized uses of their 
works.2 Those with major commercial interests in content, 
particularly the entertainment and software industries, 
understandably fear a potential loss in profits or even the end of their 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Boston College Law 
School. 
1. For descriptions of the Internet and its operation, see Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-51 (1997), Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995), PRESTON GRALLA, 
How THE INTERNET WORKS 5-7 (Millenium ed. 1999), DANIELJ. KURLAND, THE 'NET, 
THE WEB, AND You 25-29 (1996), DAVE SPERLING, DAVE SPERLING'S INTERNET 
GUIDE 2-3 (2d ed. 1998). 
2. Title 17 of the United States Code reserves to copyright holders a number of 
exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work. 17 
U.S.c. § 106(4)-(6) (Supp. IV 1998). These rights, however, are not absolute, as copyright 
deliberately circumscribes the rights of copyright holders. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) 
(denying copyright to ideas); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying the fair use doctrine); 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879) (denying the author of a book an exclusive 
property in processes or methods described therein); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (extending fair use to permit limited recording of on-air 
televsion programming); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
(applying fair use doctrine to parodies); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 
(2d Cir. 1930) (holding that playwright acquires no property right in his ideas by virtue of 
copyright). This means that unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are not necessarily 
infringements of copyright. Nevertheless, the Internet permits its users to commit 
(sometimes unwittingly) a number of acts that would be considered copyright 
infringement. 
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930 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
financial viability. ,Accordingly, these so-called "content providers" 
have taken steps to secure their interests. 
A significant component of the content providers' strategy is the 
claim that responsibility for copyright infringement on the Internet 
extends beyond the users who directly commit infringement to those 
who provide Internet technology. Copyright holders have already 
argued (with mixed success) that Internet service providers ("ISPs") 
are liable for copyright infringement committed by their users.3 
Copyright owners have also successfully asserted that other providers 
of Internet technology are liable for infringement committed by their 
users of that technology. The most famous of these cases is the 
recording industry's claim that Napster, Inc. is both vicariously and 
contributorily liable for its users' unauthorized sharing of music files.4 
Copyright owners have also successfully pursued legislative 
solutions. The recently enacted Digital Millenium Copyright Act 
("DMCA")5 contains a number of provisions designed to assist 
copyright owners' use of technology to prevent unauthorized access 
to or reproduction of works. Among other things, the DMCA 
outlaws the distribution or use of technological devices that 
circumvent encryption or other technological measures that restrict 
access to works, even if the works in question are not protected by 
copyright or the use being made is noninfringing.6 These provisions 
have allowed content providers to gain injunctive relief against those 
posting Internet links that facilitate access to circumvention 
technology.7 
Not suprisingly, these developments are controversial. Providers 
of Internet technology argue that they should not be held responsible 
for the behavior of others. Likewise, consumers of copyrighted works 
complain that these developments deprive them of access to works 
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d), (f), (g), (i) (regulating but not eliminating the 
possibility of ISP liability for user infringement); Marobie-FL Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire 
Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (generally following the Netcom 
analysis); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66 (denying plaintiffs claim for vicarious liability 
at summary judgment but refusing to deny plaintiffs claim for contributory infringement). 
For a detailed analysis of the relevant statutory and case law, see Alfred C. Yen, Internet 
Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and 
the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000). 
4. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2001) (affirming 
preliminary injunction against operators of music file sharing directory upon finding of 
vicarious and contributory liability); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmties., Inc., 239 
F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant, which 
offered Internet access to newsgroups containing infringing material, on the issue of 
whether plaintiff was barred from asserting a claim of contributory copyright 
infringement). 
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 (Supp. IV 1998). 
6. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1998). 
7. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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presently guaranteed by the copyright law. Copyright holders reply 
that these measures are necessary to protect copyrights. Anything 
less, they contend, represents a fundamental neglect of property 
rights. 
This Essay offers perspective on this debate by comparing recent 
efforts to prevent copyright infringement with similar efforts to 
prevent personal injury in tort law. Although the length of this Essay 
precludes comprehensive treatment of the issues that will be raised, it 
is hoped that its ideas will stimulate thinking and debate about the 
lengths to which society should go to ensure the security of 
copyrights. As will be described below, many recent efforts to protect 
copyrights bear considerable resemblance to the use of enterprise 
liability in tort and gun control measures. This correspondence is 
worth studying because the social balances struck in tort law and gun 
control have required intense litigation and social debate. The 
resulting compromises therefore represent a rough social consensus 
about how far we are willing to go to protect individuals from serious 
harm. If the measures desired by copyright holders seem consistent 
with the limits of personal injury law or gun control measures, then 
perhaps they do reflect our society's general values. However, if 
those measures seem more drastic than those we are willing to accept 
when guarding against serious physical injury or death, then perhaps 
recent efforts to expand copyright protection have gone too far. 
I. Copyright, Enterprise Liability, and Gun Control 
The claim that Internet technology providers are liable for 
infringement committed by users resembles the application of 
enterprise liability in tort law. Just as manufacturers of defective 
products must internalize the losses caused by their products, 
enterprises like Napster or ISPs must internalize the costs of 
copyright infringement caused by Internet technology. Such 
internalization forces enterprises to take precautions against losses 
and spread losses among their customers. Copyright holders 
undoubtedly hope that the use of enterprise liability will force 
enterprises like ISPs or N apster to stop unauthorized use of 
copyrighted works or collect licensing fees from users to pay for 
damages. 
Polygram International Publishing v. NevadalTIG8 offers clear 
evidence of the connection between copyright and tort law. That 
case, which has been cited to support liability against Internet 
8. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994). 
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technology providers,9 involved the claim that the organizers of a 
trade show were liable for unauthorized use of copyrighted music by 
exhibitors at the show. In finding for the plaintiffs, the court wrote: 
When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which 
identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair 
and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the person 
who profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to 
perform the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of 
vicarious liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost 
of doing business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it 
are better able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the 
person whose act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift 
them to others who have profited from the enterprise. In addition, 
placing responsibility for the loss on the enterprise has the added 
benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise to police its 
operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses.10 
A correspondence between copyright and personal injury also 
arises when one compares restrictions on technology to gun control. 
Just as some argue that guns must be made unavailable because they 
pose an unacceptable risk to human safety, copyright holders are 
claiming that certain technology must be made unavailable because it 
creates an unacceptable risk of copyright infringement. 
II. Some Observations About Enterprise Liability and Gun 
Control 
The application of enterprise liability and gun control concepts in 
copyright is quite plausible. The objectives of copyright and personal 
injury law bear some degree of undeniable resemblance. However, 
before the results urged in copyright can be fully accepted, some 
observations need to be made. 
First, the use of enterprise liability in tort law developed from a 
concern about physical injury to humans. Early writers about 
enterprise liability in tort specifically cited human injury, and not 
generalized economic harm, as the justification for expanding the 
scope of tort liability.H This concern for personal injury still affects 
tort doctrine to this day. For example, the so-called "economic loss 
9. See Napster, No. 00-16401 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325-
26); see also Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 36, 43, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., Nos. 
00-16401 and 00-16403 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2000). 
10. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325. 
11. For example, Fleming James spoke of injury to persons (and not all injuries) when 
making his early and influential case in favor of strict products liability: "Strict liability is 
to be preferred over a system of liability based on fault wherever you have an enterprise 
or activity, beneficial to many, which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of human 
life and limb." Fleming James Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable 
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957). 
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rule" permits recovery for economic loss only when the defendant has 
also caused physical injury to humans or property.12 Similar limits on 
recovery exist in the law of vicarious liability, particularly the 
exceptions to the independent contractor defense.13 These doctrines 
are consistent with our general social intuition that personal safety is 
generally more important than harm to property or economic 
interests.14 
Second, the fact that liability against a defendant will spread loss 
and create incentives to avoid injury has never, in and of itself, been 
considered sufficient to create that liability. If such loss spreading 
and avoidance were enough, there would be no limit to the reach of 
enterprise liability. Everyone associated with a product would 
become liable because everyone could spread loss or take 
precaution.15 Accordingly, tort law uses doctrines of defect, 
proximate cause, and assumption of risk to limit the reach of 
enterprise liability in various situations, including those that involve 
third party misuse of products.16 These doctrines explain, at least in 
part, why it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to recover against gun 
manufacturers or liquor manufacturers for personal injury caused by 
the use of their products even though such liability would spread loss 
and create incentives for safetyP Moreover, these doctrines embody 
12. See Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(applying the doctrine to prevent recovery against defendant software maker when bugs in 
software caused economic loss); Rissler & McMurry v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint 
Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo. 1996) ("The 'economic loss rule' bars recovery in 
tort when a plaintiff claims purely economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury to 
person or property."); Fishbein v. Corel Corp., 29 Pa. D. & C. 4th 289 (1996) (applying the 
economic loss rule to bar class action against defendant software manufacturer for costs of 
overcoming or correcting bug in software). 
13. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 416-417, 423, 425, 427, 427A-B, 428 
(using the term "physical harm" and not "harm" in applying the independent contractor 
defense). 
14. See Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971) (holding property owner 
liable for using deadly force to protect property absent a threat of death or serious bodily 
harm). The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85 cmt. a (1965) states: 
The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also 
to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it 
those whom he is not willing to admit, that a possessor of land has, as is stated in 
§ 79, no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious harm 
against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or meddle 
with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to the 
occupiers or users of the premises. 
15. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of 
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 527 (1985) 
("The unavoidable implication of the three presuppositions of manufacturer power, 
manufacturer insurance, and internalization is absolute liability."). 
16. See Yen, supra note 3, at 1857. 
17. Id. at 1859-62. 
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the social judgment that sole responsibility for misuse rests with the 
individual committing the misuse and not the entity providing the 
guns or alcohol. 
Finally, it must be noted that our society has not in fact enacted 
legislation that bans the possession of guns-even the so-called 
"Saturday Night Specials" frequently used in the commision of crime. 
This observation is important because handguns impose huge 
amounts of tragic loss on society. Nevertheless, the social judgment 
expressed through our political and judicial processes is that even the 
terrible loss of human life is not enough to justify depriving citizens of 
the legitimate uses of handguns. The argument that "guns don't kill 
people, people do" reflects society's prevailing sentiment about the 
possibility of making guns truly unavailable. 
ID. Comparing Copyright to Personal Injury 
The foregoing observations about personal injury law create 
some interesting implications for the expansion of copyright 
protection. At the outset, one should notice that the application of 
enterprise liability to products developed as a form of consumer 
protection.18 One could argue that the use of enterprise liability in 
copyright turns everything upside down by protecting commercial 
entities from consumers, and not vice versa. It is as if copyright 
holders have been transformed into victims analogous to people 
injured by defective automobiles. The use of enterprise liability to 
protect copyrights seems even stranger when one recognizes that 
copyright infringement inflicts intangible economic injuries, and not 
the pbysical personal injuries that justify the use of enterprise liability 
in tort law.19 
As noted earlier, plaintiffs injured by misuse of guns or alcohol 
have practically no chance of recovering from gun or alcohol 
manufacturers.2o This reflects the social judgment that the losses 
suffered by those plaintiffs are not sufficiently serious to extend tort 
liability beyond the person committing the misuse. If we apply the 
same values in copyright, it is not clear why the harm of copyright 
infringement justifies the sort of extended liability deemed 
inappropriate in the case of guns or alcohol. To be sure, one could 
consider bodily injury and copyright infringement equally grave,21 but 
18. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (influential 
early products liability case in which plaintiff recovers against defendant on breach of 
warranty theory). 
19. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
21. In reference to the threat of copyright infringement posed by video cassette 
recorders, Motion Picture Association of America President Jack Valenti has been quoted 
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it is doubtful that society generally agrees with such a calibration of 
values. 
Finally, the same sort of question seems relevant when 
considering anti-circumvention legislation. If our society does not 
think that gunshot wounds justify a general prohibition against the 
possession of guns, why should it deem copyrights important enough 
to support a similar prohibition against certain kinds of computer 
technology?22 
IV. Should Copyright or Personal Injury Law Change? 
A possible response to the foregoing is that tort and gun control 
laws need to change. If copyright is "ahead of" these areas of law by 
offering more generous protection against the misbehavior of 
individuals, then perhaps tort or gun control law should itself offer 
more generous protection. There is undeniable attraction to this 
proposition, particularly if one is frustrated by our society's 
willingness to take on gun manufacturers and other alleged 
tortfeasors. However, it is not at all clear that such a change would be 
desirable, even from the perspective of the entertainment and 
software industries pushing for more copyright protection. 
As noted earlier, if the principles of loss spreading and loss 
avoidance are in and of themselves sufficient to establish enterprise 
liability, it is not clear that liability for copyright infringement stops 
with ISPs or Napster-like services. Manufacturers of operating 
systems, CD-ROM burners, Internet browsers, and computer chips 
all know that their products are used to commit copyright 
infringement and are in a position to both spread loss and take 
precautions. To the extent that some of these manufacturers are 
copyright owners desirous of greater copyright protection,23 would 
they be happy if they were also financially responsible for the 
behavior of those who use their technology? 
Consider what might happen if society decided to equate 
intangible economic harm with bodily injury for purposes of imposing 
enterprise liability. If society guards against intangible economic 
injuries as fiercely as it does bodily injury, manufacturers of software 
may find themselves exposed to lawsuits for economic harm. 
saying that the video cassette recorder "is to the American film producer and the 
American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone." Adam Liptak, Is 
Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at Art & 
Ideas/Cultural Desk. 
22. Although the scope of this Essay prevents further exploration of the possible 
responses to this question, at least one possible line of inquiry is suggested infra at note 27. 
23. For example, Microsoft is a leading content provider and maker of operating 
systems. 
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Presently, the economic loss rule protects software manufacturers 
from economic losses caused by defects in software precisely because 
economic losses are considered less important than physical personal 
injury.24 If that distinction disappears, those who suffer financially 
because of software that they or others use may find that a significant 
barrier to their recovery no longer exists. 
The entertainment industry may also have similar problems 
under an expanded liability regime. That industry knows that 
consumers who watch television stunts or listen to violent music lyrics 
sometimes imitate what they consume. For example, a teenager in 
Connecticut recently suffered second and third degree burns when he 
and his friends tried to duplicate a stunt from MTV in which a person 
sat on a barbeque grill while having lighter fluid sprayed on his 
body.25 Existing law generally bars plaintiffs in such cases from 
recovery, even when the First Amendment concerns are ignored.26 If 
society begins expanding liability for such injury beyond the 
immediate misusers (i.e., the children themselves), the entertainment 
industry might lose protection from liability that it surely values. 
Conclusion 
This Essay suggests that recent efforts to expand copyright 
protection are inconsistent with our society's willingness to place 
responsibility for misbehavior on people other than those 
immediately committing the misbehavior. When one considers the 
limits that exist in tort law and gun control legislation, it seems that 
copyright's recent expansion may put society in the odd position of 
doing more to prevent copyright infringement than personal injury. 
Perhaps, then, extended liability claims against ISPs and restrictions 
on certain computer technologies upset a well-accepted social balance 
and should be curtailed. 
This does not mean, of course, that society should not protect 
copyrights. Those who acquire technology that makes copyright 
infringement possible must use it responsibly or face liability. Some 
vicarious or contributory copyright claims will make sense. 
Nevertheless, the undesirability of overzealous enforcement is part of 
copyright theory itself. Copyright's social bargain involves the 
24. See Rou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(applying the doctrine to prevent recovery against defendant software maker when bugs in 
software caused economic loss); Fishbein v. Corel Corp., 29 Pa. D. & c. 4th 289 (1996) 
(applying the economic loss rule to bar class action against defendant software 
manufacturer for costs of overcoming or correcting bug in software). 
25. See Teen Burned Imitating MTV Stunt, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, at 
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2001). 
26. See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to 
Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2000). 
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judgment that property rights must be offset by free unpermitted 
access to works. That is why doctrines like the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine exist. These doctrines make 
copyright an insecure property right, one subject to unconsented use 
by consumers. Eliminating that insecurity from the Internet upsets an 
important social judgment. 
To be sure, the conclusions offered here cannot be considered 
final, as the space available does not permit a complete examination 
of all the relevant issues. A particularly interesting topic for further 
study would be the degree to which existing or potentially legitimate 
uses of Internet technology govern their appropriate treatmentP 
The resolution of possibilities such as these requires fairly detailed 
study about the various types of products whose distribution society 
restricts or whose manufacturers might be held liable for their 
products'. misuse. The point here is merely that we must be careful 
about blithely accepting the assertion that copyrights are property, 
and that we can never do enough to protect property. As of this 
writing, we do not even know if copyright based industries are truly 
threatened by enterprises like ISPs and Napster or circumvention 
technologies.28 Society has always expressed limits on the reach of 
27. This line of inquiry was first brought to the Author's attention in discussions with 
members of the CyberProf listserv, with particularly helpful contributions from Eugene 
Volokh, Justin Hughes, and Lydia Pallas Loren. 
For example, one might argue that guns are not banned because they can be put to a 
number of legitimate uses, including self-defense, target shooting, and hunting. Perhaps 
then only those Internet technologies without substantial noninfringing uses should be 
subject to restriction. Recent anti-circumvention legislation and case law arguably 
embody this principle. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1998) (restricting 
distribution of devices with "only limited commercially significant purpose or use other 
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work"); 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (refusing to apply 
contributory liability against technology merely capable of substantial noninfringing use). 
One might also assert, however, that society has not consistently banned nor exposed 
to tort liability even those gun-related products with few legitimate uses. For example, 
courts have refused to hold liable the makers of hollowpoint bullets that increase the 
severity of injury by expanding upon contact with the body. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 
119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of complaint against manufacturer of 
hollowpoint bullets designed to increase severity of injury, sold to the general public, and 
used during a mass shooting of commuters). Perhaps these bullets should be left 
unregulated against the contingency that a citizen would face attack by an assailant 
undeterred by an ordinary bullet. Yet, if this claim were accepted, it would also seem as if 
Internet technologies with fairly limited noninfringing uses should also remain relatively 
unregulated, especially if one believes that preventing unwarranted gunshot wounds is 
more important than preventing copyright infringement. 
28. See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet 
Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, _ U. 
DATION L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that in the long run, technology like 
Napster will not destroy incentives for the production of recorded music). 
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liability, and until society has more time to think about the Internet, a 
cautious approach to expanding copyright protection seems wise. 
